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Abstract
Livestock movements in Great Britain are well recorded, have been extensively analysed with respect to their role in disease
spread, and have been used in real time to advise governments on the control of infectious diseases. Typically, livestock
holdings are treated as distinct entities that must observe movement standstills upon receipt of livestock, and must report
livestock movements. However, there are currently two dispensations that can exempt holdings from either observing
standstills or reporting movements, namely the Sole Occupancy Authority (SOA) and Cattle Tracing System (CTS) Links,
respectively. In this report we have used a combination of data analyses and computational modelling to investigate the
usage and potential impact of such linked holdings on the size of a Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) epidemic. Our analyses
show that although SOAs are abundant, their dynamics appear relatively stagnant. The number of CTS Links is also
abundant, and increasing rapidly. Although most linked holdings are only involved in a single CTS Link, some holdings are
involved in numerous links that can be amalgamated to form ‘‘CTS Chains’’ which can be both large and geographically
dispersed. Our model predicts that under a worst case scenario of ‘‘one infected – all infected’’, SOAs do pose a risk of
increasing the size (in terms of number of infected holdings) of a FMD epidemic, but this increase is mainly due to intra-SOA
infection spread events. Furthermore, although SOAs do increase the geographic spread of an epidemic, this increase is
predominantly local. Whereas, CTS Chains pose a risk of increasing both the size and the geographical spread of the disease
substantially, under a worse case scenario. Our results highlight the need for further investigations into whether CTS Chains
are transmission chains, and also investigations into intra-SOA movements and livestock distributions due to the lack of
current data.
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Introduction
Explicit network data are increasingly being used for the
development of mathematical models to inform disease control
[1,2,3,4,5]. In Great Britain (GB), livestock movements are well
recorded and describe the dynamic network of connections among
livestock holding locations. These connections can be critical for
disease spread, as was shown in the 2001 epidemic of foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom (UK) [6]. Control of
the 2001 FMD epidemic resulted in approximately 8.5 million
livestock culled, and is estimated to have cost GBP 4–6 billion [7].
Since 2001, a number of policies have been introduced to reduce
the possible impact of the reintroduction of FMD, including
movement standstills for holdings in receipt of animal movements
[8].
The Cattle Tracing System (CTS) records the movements of
cattle at the individual level for all of GB, whilst the Animal
Movements License System (AMLS) records the movements of
other large livestock (e.g. sheep, pigs) at the batch level in England
and Wales; in Scotland, a database equivalent to AMLS is held by
the Scottish Animal Movements Unit (SAMU). Movement data
have been extensively utilised for modelling the spread of
infectious diseases of livestock [1,2,3,4,5]. However, movements
represent just one mechanism by which infectious diseases can
spread [3,6,9], and the utility of additional detailed data is at least
partially dependent on the importance of alternative mechanisms
of transmission.
Livestock holding locations in GB are assigned a unique County
Parish Holding (CPH) number. Typically such holdings are
treated as distinct entities that must observe movement standstills
upon receipt of any livestock (6 days for cattle and sheep in both
England/Wales, 13 days in Scotland, and 20 days for pigs
throughout GB [8]), and must report any livestock movements to
CTS or AMLS. However, there are currently two dispensations
that can exempt holdings from either observing standstills or
reporting movements.
A group of holdings within the same management and control
may be granted a Sole Occupancy Authority (SOA, [10]). When
sheep, pigs and cattle are brought onto any one of the holdings
within the SOA a standstill is imposed on all the holdings in the
SOA. However, animals may move between holdings inside the
SOA without observing the standstill, allowing infection to spread
rapidly amongst SOA members. Although there is a requirement
for all intra-SOA movements to be reported, the 5 mile rule for
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2sheep and goats previously exempted the reporting of movements
between land that is within 5 miles and under the same control; we
note that the 5 mile rule for sheep and goats has recently been
disbanded in England [11] and now all movements between
different CPHs must be reported. However, the reporting of intra-
SOA cattle movements to CTS has always been required. A
holding can only be a part of one SOA at a time, restricting the
extent to which SOAs can create bridges across the community;
however, there are currently no distance limits between holdings
in the SOA. Thus SOAs may not only increase the risk of disease
spread between the holdings, but may also link otherwise
unconnected ‘communities’ within the livestock movement
network, as such communities typically show strong spatial
aggregation [12].
Cattle keepers may apply to the British Cattle Movement
Service (BCMS) to have two CPH numbers linked on CTS for the
purpose of exempting them from reporting movements of cattle
between the two linked CPHs, thus creating what is called a ‘‘CTS
Link’’ [10]. There is currently no limit to the number of CTS
Links that an individual holding can be in. However, farmers must
still record movements between linked holdings in their herd farm
records. There are two different types of CTS Links [10]: (1)
Shared Facilities (SF’s) – links between holdings under the same
ownership which share facilities, these links must be permanent
(longer than 364 days), the movements frequent, and holdings
must be within 25 miles of each other; and (2) Additional Land
(AL’s) – links between holdings for summer grazing and winter
housing, there is no mileage restriction, but the link is temporary
and must be renewed after 364 days. The existence of CTS Links
can increase: (1) The risk of disease spread because of increased
contiguity and because standstill violations are difficult to police;
(2) The difficulty of tracing any cattle because movements over
potentially long distances are not reported to CTS; and (3) The
number of holdings which may be assumed to be contiguous to an
infected holding (linked farms would be assumed contiguous to one
another), thereby increasing the costs associated with containing a
disease outbreak.
In order to assess the additional risk associated with these
exemptions, we investigate if usages of SOAs and CTS Links are
substantial and increasing, we identify other characteristics of
holdings involved in such linkages, and then use computational
modelling to assess the potential impact of such linked holdings on
both the overall size and geographical spread of an FMD
epidemic. In our previous modelling work, the inclusion of SOAs
had only a minimal impact on final epidemic size {Green,2006}.
However, the increased number of SOAs since then and the
additional effect of CTS Links merits further investigation of their
impact on FMD spread.
Results
Data Analysis - SOAs
Data on all SOAs in England and Wales were combined with
census data and AMLS animal movements for an analysis of SOAs
and the holdings that comprise them. As can be seen in Figure 1A,
the number of SOAs in England/Wales has been steadily
increasing over time. There was an initial rapid increase in the
number of SOAs during the first 9 months they were in existence
to just under 25,000 SOAs, with subsequent steady increases to
around 29,000 at the start of 2008, consisting of just over 100,000
distinct holdings. SOAs typically consist of less than ten holdings
and have a modal value of 2 holdings (Figure 1B). However, large
SOAs do exist with the largest consisting of 250 holdings, although
this is an outlier with the next largest consisting of 48 holdings.
Holdings within SOAs tend to be located close to one another.
Over 90% of the holdings that comprise each SOA are within
10 km of the other holdings of that SOA, while almost 100% are
within 50 km (Figure S1), implying that intra-SOA disease spread
alone will result in few, if any, long-range jumps leading to new
areas of the county becoming infected.
2008 AMLS census data for England and Wales was analysed to
determine the number of livestock that reside within SOAs. SOAs
contain a large proportion of the livestock in England and Wales:
48.7%, 33.7% and 21.7% of sheep, cattle and pigs respectively.
Most SOAs had all livestock recorded within a single holding.
Every SOA consisting of 27 or more holdings had all livestock
recorded within a single holding. Even those SOAs with animals
recorded at more than one holding within the SOA tended to have
the majority of their livestock reported at a single holding. For
example, of the 345 SOAs with animals recorded at two or more
holdings within the SOA, 143 had over 90% of animals at one
holding. It is understandable that the June agricultural survey
might record all pigs and sheep of a single owner to a single CPH,
but it is not clear why cattle on CTS also tended to be reported at
the same single holding, and so sensitivity to livestock locations
must be considered when using these data for the purposes of
disease control analyses.
AMLS movements were analysed to determine how the overall
volume of movements attributed to holdings within SOAs has
been changing since 2005. As can be seen in Figure 2, AMLS
recorded movements of sheep ‘‘from’’ SOAs contribute 44% of all
recorded movements ‘‘from’’ agricultural holdings on AMLS. This
is to be expected given that almost half (48.7%) of all sheep in
England and Wales reside within SOAs. Movements ‘‘to’’ SOAs
also accounted for a major percentage of the overall movements
‘‘to’’ agricultural holdings on AMLS (Figure S2). In both
categories, there are seasonal variations in movement volumes,
but overall SOA movements appear stable. Similarly, AMLS pig
movements to and from SOAs were also analysed and again
showed seasonal variations but overall appear stable; CTS cattle
movements to and from SOAs were not analysed in this study.
There appear to be very few intra-SOA movements recorded on
AMLS, only ,500 SOAs have an intra-SOA movement recorded
in 2008. This may be surprising given that all intra-SOA
movements must be reported and that one of the main advantages
of forming an SOA is so that animals can move freely within the
SOA without observing standstills. However, this could in part be
explained by the previous 5 mile rule for sheep and goats, as CPHs
within SOAs tend to be located very near each other and are
under the same management and control. Therefore, although the
lack of reported intra-SOA movements may be expected, it does
present a difficulty for modelling strategies due to the lack of data
on intra-SOA movement activities. Furthermore, not many SOAs
are leaving the scheme (Figure S3), and analysis showed that a
substantial number (approximately one third) had no movements
reported on AMLS in 2008, suggesting that many SOAs may well
be redundant and are no longer being used; although these SOAs
may well be active on CTS.
Data Analysis – CTS Links
Data on all active CTS Links between 2003 and 2008 in GB
were combined with CTS movement data for an analysis of CTS
Links and the holdings that comprise them. As can be seen in
Figure 3a, the number of CTS Links classed as ‘‘Shared Facility’’
has increased dramatically with the number of links almost
doubling between the start of 2003 and end of 2008. Furthermore,
the number of links registered as ‘‘Additional Land’’ has also
increased (Figure 3b), but shows substantial (seasonal) variation
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2008, there were approximately 17,500 active CTS Links
involving just under 26,000 different holdings. Overall, the
increase in linked holdings may well be a cause for concern in
terms of disease spread, especially if Shared Facilities imply close
and frequent contact between livestock from different holdings.
There is no limit to the number of CTS Links that a holding can
be in, but the majority of holdings are involved in only a single
Figure 1. Number of SOAs in existence over time and the distribution of component holdings. (A) Shows the monthly number of SOAs in
existence from their inception in late 2001 to mid-2008. (B) Shows the distribution of the number of component holdings that comprise each SOA;
the x-axis has been truncated to remove the outlier SOA containing 250 holdings for display purposes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035089.g001
Figure 2. Comparison of sheep movements from SOAs vs Non-SOAs between 2005 and 2008. Monthly sheep movements from
agricultural holdings within SOAs are shown in blue bars, whilst monthly sheep movements from agricultural holdings not in SOAs (Non-SOAs) are
shown in red bars. The total number of SOAs and Non-SOAs contributing to the month’s sheep movements are shown with the blue and red lines
respectively. Movements to the same holdings or the same SOA were removed along with movements to slaughter. Only movements from
‘‘agricultural holdings’’ to other ‘‘agricultural holdings’’ or ‘‘store markets’’ were considered.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035089.g002
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large number of links. As a result, groups of linked holdings can be
formed from the amalgamation of these individual CTS Links,
which we have termed ‘‘CTS Chains’’. CTS Chains can be large
(Figure 3c), with the largest chain involving 242 distinct holdings,
although the next biggest chain consists of only 48 premises. While
there is a 25-mile distance limit on shared facility links, there is no
distance limit on additional land links so CTS Chains can be
geographically dispersed. For example, the largest chain in 2008
(242 holdings) links southwest Scotland to the North of England,
and onwards to North Wales (Figure 4). A chain of such a size is a
clear concern, but cancelling just a few of the component CTS
Links would break this chain down into smaller, less geograph-
ically dispersed units. Therefore, perhaps the resulting CTS
Figure 3. Daily total number of active CTS Links. The daily number of active CTS Links classed as Shared Facility (A) and Additional Land (B)
from 2003 to 2008. (C) Shows the frequency distribution of CTS Chain sizes; the outlier chain of size 242 was removed from this chart, whilst the
second largest chain consist of 48 component holdings.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035089.g003
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individual CTS Links. In addition, some CTS Chains can be
increased further in size when SOAs are also considered, as there
are currently no restrictions on holdings being within both an
SOA and a CTS Link at the same time. The structure of the
largest CTS Chain (Figure 4) shows that although two of the
holdings are involved in a large number of links, the majority of
holdings are involved in relatively few links. This could well imply
that if a disease were introduced into one end of a large chain,
infection would probably take a long time to filter through the
individual binary links that comprise the CTS chain to infect all
the other holdings.
A directed network of 73,926 premises (nodes) and 317,816
movements (edges) was created based on batched GB cattle
movements for 2008. CTS Links active on 01/01/2008 consisted
of 25,932 premises and 35,404 links between them. Adding these
CTS Links to the network creates more connections and as
expected, the movement network is, in a sense, more connected.
The distribution of strongly connected component sizes (the size of
the maximal set of nodes such that there is a directed path
connecting each pair of nodes) for the network with and without
these CTS Links (Figure 5a) shows a marked difference in
structure; without CTS Links the movements network has one
very large component (composed of 45,072 nodes) and most of the
other premises are either unconnected or part of a small
component. Adding the CTS Links, although creating a larger
network of 88,654 nodes and 350,648 edges, also increases the
number of nodes in the larger component to 54,786 and the
frequency and size of smaller components. There is a correspond-
ing decrease in the number of unconnected nodes once CTS Links
are added.
Of the CTS Links (nodes and edges) that are added to the
movement network 43.2% of the premises are already in the
movement network (having had a movement of cattle in the year).
It is interesting to note that 7.3% of CTS Links were already
present in the movement network, although this could be a result
of CTS Links that did not exist for the whole of 2008 and so
movements were reported. However, if we compare the shortest
paths between connected premises in the movement network
before and after adding the CTS Links, (Figure 5b) we see that
adding CTS Links shortens the paths between the connected
premises in the movement network. Thus the CTS Links provide a
mechanism for moving between premises in fewer steps.
CTS movement data were analysed to see if the overall volume
of movements attributed to holdings within CTS Links has been
increasing over time. As can be seen in Figure 6, movements ‘‘to’’
agricultural holdings in CTS Links (represented as a percentage of
movements ‘‘to’’ all agricultural holdings) has been steadily
increasing over the years from 20% in 2003, peaking at 30% in
mid 2007, and finishing at 27% at the end of 2008, as would be
expected from the increase in holdings registered with CTS Links.
Movements ‘‘from’’ agricultural holdings in CTS Links also show
a similar pattern (Figure 6). The proportionate increase in
movements from CTS Linked holdings in August 2007 (Figure 6)
represents their greater proportion of movements to slaughter,
which were largely unaffected at a time when other movements
were being restricted due to the outbreak of FMD at that time.
Modelling - SOAs
In the 2001 FMD epidemic, two factors resulted in the
exceptional difficulties associated with control. First, the rapid
rise in numbers of holdings affected meant that logistical capability
Figure 4. Network structure of the largest observed CTS Chain. This is the network structure of the largest CTS Chain consisting of 242
holdings. Each box represents a distinct holding, and links between boxes represent CTS Links. Boxes coloured Red, Green, and Yellow are holdings
located in Wales, England, and Scotland respectively. Boxes are labelled with their holding’s county number.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035089.g004
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geographical extent meant that the control effort could not be
concentrated in one area, further increasing the cost of control [9].
Here, we investigate the impact of exemptions on both the number
of premises affected, and the geographical distribution.
Because of the potentially complicated interactions between
spatial spread, spread due to different species and spread due to
Figure 5. Shortest path analysis of cattle network with and without CTS Links. (A) Strongly connected component size of the cattle
movements network for 2008 with (blue) and without (red) CTS Links. Adding CTS Links increases the size of the largest component (from 45072 to
54786, not shown here) and also increases the size and frequency of the smaller components; (B) Difference between the shortest path length
distribution of connected premises in the cattle movements network for 2008 with and without CTS Links. The path length difference is calculated by
subtracting the distribution of shortest path lengths for the movement network from the movement network with CTS Links (comparing the same
connected premises).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035089.g005
Figure 6. Movements to and from CTS Linked Holdings represented as a percentage of total movements. This chart shows the monthly
movements on CTS that come From (red bars) and go To (blue bars) CTS Linked holdings, represented as a percentage of total movements from and
to all holdings over time. For the ‘From’ category, only normal and inferred off movements from agricultural holdings in the VLA_MOVEMENTS table
of CTS were considered, whilst for the ‘To’ category, only normal and inferred on movements to agricultural holdings were considered. The blue and
red lines represent the percentage of holdings that have a From (blue) or To (red) movement that month and are in a CTS Link.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035089.g006
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approach to summarise the impact of all these factors on the two
outcomes described above – number of premises and geographical
spread. In our previous work [3], CTS and AMLS movement data
were used to construct an individual holding based model of the
initial spread of FMD in GB to determine the susceptibility of the
GB livestock industry to future outbreaks. Transmission through
movements was modelled, with additional local spread unrelated
to the known movements, as well as intra-SOA spread.
Simulations showed that movements can result in a large
nationwide epidemic, but only if cattle are heavily involved, or
the epidemic occurs in late summer or early autumn. Inclusion of
local spread can considerably increase epidemic size, but has only
a small impact on the spatial extent of the disease. Importantly, the
inclusion of intra-SOA spread had only a minimal impact on final
epidemic size. However, the increased number of SOAs since then
and the additional effect of CTS Links merits further investigation
of their impact on FMD spread.
Therefore, this approach [3] was updated to consider the
updated data on both SOAs and CTS Links and was re-run with
the latest movement data from AMLS and CTS for 2008; the
model was run for England and Wales only, as updated Scottish
data were unavailable at the time of the analysis. We also consider
two stocking scenarios for intra-SOA spread: (1) where the
recorded distribution of stock numbers within SOA member
holdings is correct; and (2) where stock are evenly distributed
amongst SOA member holdings. While the mechanisms of SOAs
and CTS Links are different, for this study we assume that their
role in FMD spread is similar – rapid spread amongst holdings
that would otherwise be of limited risk to each other, thereby
increasing the potential for onward spread to other holdings.
Although this is a worst-case scenario, there is currently
insufficient information on SOA stock levels as well as intra-
SOA and intra-Chain movements to develop realistic alternatives.
We allow the epidemic to run for a period of one month, in
order to explore the complex relationship between the explicit
network of livestock movements, and the possible role of
dispensations on disease spread. This is not meant to be realistic;
identification of FMD on a holding would result in an immediate
movement ban, possibly at the national level, and the probability
of detection is related to a number of factors, most importantly the
number of premises affected. However, use of a fixed time frame
for spread provides for a basis of comparison with our previous
work [5] and is an indication of the relative impact of these
dispensations on FMD spread, compared to 2001 when silent
spread occurred for roughly this period.
As can be seen in Figure 7, when intra-SOA spread is limited to
only holdings with reported stock, the inclusion of SOAs appears
to have little effect on epidemic size. This is consistent with our
previous results [3] which did not investigate alternative stocking
scenarios. As the majority of SOAs have reported stock at only one
holding within the SOA, there is little intra-SOA spread recorded
in the model as there are no other stock containing holdings within
the SOA to infect with the disease and subsequently spread out
from via local spread.
However, when this stock limitation is removed and one
assumes animals are evenly distributed throughout the SOA,
bigger epidemics occur throughout the year (Figure 7). Note
however that epidemics are larger in terms of holdings infected,
rather than animals infected, and that the within SOA animal
population is the same but distributed among more holdings. The
model was used to investigate whether imposing distance limits on
the holdings that comprise the SOAs would have an affect on
epidemic size. Distance limits of 50 km and 16 km have little effect
on epidemic size, whilst 8 km has only a small effect (Figure 7),
consistent with the usual close proximity of holdings within SOAs.
This suggests that the majority of the effect of increased epidemic
size is the ‘‘book-keeping’’ increase in infected holdings within
SOAs themselves, rather than new areas being affected. Indeed, as
the model categorises the cause (movement, local, or intra-SOA
spread) of each infection event, one can see that the increase in
epidemic size is predominantly the result of holdings becoming
infected via intra-SOA infection spread (Figure 8). However,
infection via movement and local spread does also increase
suggesting there is also onward transmission from other holdings
within the SOA.
Another measure of risk is the geographical spread of the
epidemic. In the model, GB is subdivided into a grid consisting of
squares of 100 km
2, where each square contains the relevant
holdings as defined by their easting/northing coordinates. The
number of grid squares with at least one infected holding at the
end of the simulation is a proxy for the extent of geographical
spread. The imposition of distance limits to constrain intra-SOA
spread has little effect on geographical spread (Figure 7), indicating
that long range jumps infecting new parts of the country are rare,
and that the increased geographical spread is predominately local
with neighbouring grid squares becoming infected. Therefore,
under the worst-case scenario (one infected – all infected) of intra-
SOA spread, although an increase in logistical (veterinary,
slaughter teams etc.) resources may likely be required to handle
any increase in the number of infected premises, these resources
would not be required in a much larger geographical area as a
result of intra-SOA spread.
Modelling – CTS Links
Although CTS Links form dyads, numerous holdings are
involved in more than one link. Therefore, CTS Links can be
amalgamated together to form CTS Chains, which can be
imported into the model and treated as sets of holdings equivalent
to SOAs. The inclusion of CTS Chains alone (without SOAs) into
the model does substantially increase epidemic size (Figure 9),
although CTS Chains have less of an effect on epidemic size than
SOAs. Furthermore, CTS Chains substantially increase the
geographical spread of the epidemic (Figure 9), resulting in
smaller but more geographically dispersed epidemics when
compared to SOAs. As in the SOA model, we then applied
distance limits to intra-CTS Chain spread of 50 km, 16 km, and
8 km (Figure 9). In contrast to SOAs, the distance limits are
important, with the 50 km limit having a large impact on epidemic
size, and the 16 km and 8 km limits reduce epidemic sizes still
further (Figure 9). However, increased epidemic sizes are still
observed even with severe distance limits. The geographical spread
of epidemics when CTS Chains are incorporated into the model
was also examined. The distance limits again have more of an
effect on geographical spread when compared to SOAs (Figure 9),
with the 8 km limit reducing the geographical spread to close to
that observed in the control model with no linked holdings at all.
This again highlights the fact that holdings linked via CTS Links
are more geographically dispersed than those linked via SOAs.
Modelling – SOAs and CTS Links
SOAs and CTS Links/Chains can be combined together to
form a single set of linked holdings, resulting in even bigger
epidemics than SOAs or CTS Links alone (Figure S5).
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e35089Figure 7. Comparison of epidemic sizes with SOAs. The model was run including SOAs, with no stock restriction on intra-SOA spread and the
following distance limits on intra-SOA spread: No Limit (red), 50 km (green), 16 km (purple), and 8 km (black). In addition, the results from the SOA
model with intra-SOA spread restricted to holdings with stock recorded as present is shown in blue. Epidemic size (number of infected holdings per
seed) and geographical size (number of infected grid squares per seed) were firstly transformed into percentages of the control epidemic size (with
no linked holdings) from the same time of year. Secondly, averages were then obtained for the four quarters of the year (Jan-Feb-Mar[squares], Apr-
May-Jun [circles], Jul-Aug-Sep [triangles], Oct-Nov-Dec [diamonds]) giving four data points for each scenario. Error bars are associated with each
quarterly average value that represent the 95% confidence intervals for that quarter, assuming a normal distribution and a standard deviation
calculated from that quarter’s data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035089.g007
Figure 8. The effect of SOAs on epidemic size – source of infection. Each data point is the number of infected holdings per seed, generated
from 400 stochastic simulations of FMD epidemics starting at that time of year, each with five seeds. The model keeps track of how each holding
becomes infected, which can be via one of three routes: 1) Movements; 2) Local spread; and 3) Intra-SOA spread. The grey line shows the total
number of infected holdings per seed for the normal Control model, with no SOAs or linked holdings. The grey line is therefore composed of
Movement and Local spread infection events only. The red line shows the number of Movement and Local spread infection events (per seed) for the
SOA model, which increases the size of epidemics throughout the year. However, the green line shows all (Movements+Local+intra-SOA) infection
events (per seed) for the SOA model. As can be seen, the biggest contributor to the increase in epidemic size as a result of including SOAs is intra-
SOA spread itself– other premises within the SOA becoming infected. Epidemic sizes are measured in terms of number of infected holdings – not
number of infected animals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035089.g008
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Although there was an initial rapid increase in the number of
SOAs when they were introduced, their numbers have only been
increasing gradually in recent years. Furthermore, the volume of
movements attributed to SOAs over recent years remains
relatively constant. However, the analysis did reveal a number of
points of potential concern. There appear to be very few intra-
SOA movements recorded in the AMLS database despite a
requirement that all such movements be reported. This could be
explained by the previous 5 mile rule for sheep and goats, whereby
movements under 5 miles between land under the same ownership
and control did not need to be reported. As holdings within SOAs
tend to be located very near each other, and are under the same
control, this could well explain the lack of intra-SOA movements;
we note that the 5 mile rule for sheep and goats has recently been
disbanded [11] and now all movements between different CPHs
must be reported. An alternative explanation for the lack of intra-
SOA movement data is that there could be confusion on the
reporting requirements with different rules governing SOAs and
CTS Links combined with the 5 mile rule for sheep and goats.
Our modelling work showed that SOAs do pose a potential risk
of increasing the number of holdings infected in an epidemic
considerably, if the worst case scenario of ‘‘one infected – all
infected’’ is assumed. However, the majority of the effect of
increased epidemic size is the ‘‘book-keeping’’ increase in infected
holdings within SOAs themselves. Furthermore, SOAs did not
greatly effect the geographical spread of the epidemic, which is to
be expected given that the component holdings within an SOA
appear to be located near each other, typically within 10 km.
Overall, the effect in terms of epidemic size of including SOAs into
simulations appears to be mainly due to intra-SOA spread, in that
infection events as a result of the disease spreading within the SOA
contributes a large proportion to the overall epidemic size. There
is currently insufficient information on stock levels and intra-SOA
movements to determine whether or not this worst case is relevant,
and so it is an indicator of a need for future data collection.
If the reported stock levels are correct, in that typically an SOA
only has stock located at one holding, then SOAs would not
appear to be a major risk in terms of epidemic size, as holdings
without stock can not contract and therefore pass on the disease
via local and movement based spread. This is consistent with
additional registered CPHs within an SOA representing grazing
land with no permanent stock. For example, within an SOA of five
holdings that are used for grazing, at any one time only one
holding may have stock on it, thus limiting the possibilities for
disease spread. However, Figure 7 shows that there is a
considerable difference if premises are stocked more evenly,
suggesting that a more detailed understanding of intra-SOA
movements and stock levels would be useful. The simulation
results presented here are in terms of infected holdings, whereby
intra-SOA spread results in more holdings becoming infected.
However, if the majority of SOA holdings have no stock, then the
number of livestock slaughtered within the SOA will increase little
as a result of intra-SOA spread. It should also be noted that all
valid SOAs are included in the above simulations. The data
analysis did suggest that there could be a redundant accumulation
of SOAs, as few SOAs seem to leave the scheme, and a fair
amount of SOAs appear to be inactive in terms of movement into
or out of the SOA on AMLS. Given the potential risk of SOAs in
Figure 7, this could suggest that a clean up of inactive SOAs would
be valuable in assessing the true risk associated with SOAs.
The number of CTS Linked holdings, especially those linked via
Shared Facilities, appears to be increasing rapidly and the volume
of movements from such CTS linked holdings is also increasing.
This is in contrast to AMLS movements from SOAs, which
Figure 9. Comparison of epidemic sizes and geographical spread with different linked holdings. The model was run including CTS
Chains, with the following distance limits on intra-Chain spread: No Limit (red), 50 km (green), 16 km (purple), and 8 km (black). Epidemic size
(number of infected holdings per seed) and geographical size (number of infected grid squares per seed) were firstly transformed into percentages of
the control epidemic size from the same time of year. Secondly, averages were then obtained for the four quarters of the year (Jan-Feb-Mar [squares],
Apr-May-Jun [circles], Jul-Aug-Sep [triangles], Oct-Nov-Dec [diamonds]) giving four data points for each scenario. Error bars are associated with each
quarterly average value that represent the 95% confidence intervals for that quarter, assuming a normal distribution and a standard deviation
calculated from that quarter’s data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035089.g009
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little redundant accumulation of inactive holdings within the CTS
Links. Currently, there is neither a limit on the number of CTS
Links an individual holding can be in, nor a limit on the distance
between CTS linked holdings via the Additional Land category.
Combined, these features can lead to large chains of linked
holdings that can also be geographically dispersed throughout the
country; however, the vast majority of chains only contain 2
holdings. These chains can then grow even further as there is
currently no restriction on being within an SOA and in CTS Links
at the same time.
In the worst case scenario (all members of a CTS Chain
potentially directly linked, or linked within a short time), large and
geographically dispersed CTS Chains are potentially a risk in
terms of disease spread. Applying a 50 km distance limit on
transmission amongst CTS Links markedly reduces epidemic size,
suggesting that allowing long-range links or a short series of links
covering a large distance may be an important risk. However,
further investigations should be made as to whether or not the
CTS Chains are also transmission chains – if multiple links in a
chain are not used in the timeframe of FMD spread (at most a few
weeks for single holdings), then they are not important in this
context. Even if all links in the chain were active, it would take
time for the disease to spread via cattle movements through each
binary link in the largest chain – this was not considered here as
we used a ‘‘one infected – all infected’’ approach to intra-CTS
Chain spread similar to intra-SOA spread. Furthermore, while
movements are not recorded, standstills are still expected to be in
effect, and investigation into standstill compliance within chains
may be merited.
The scenarios presented here examine worst-case scenarios for
disease spread, with members of SOAs assumed to have the same
infection status throughout. In reality, this would only be the case
in a limited number of instances in a real outbreak, and although
our data analysis does highlight a number of points for further
investigation, it is important to balance the need for adequate
disease prevention and control with commercial activity so that
holdings can perform competitively. Shared Facility links where
holdings share milking parlours are clearly essential, and would
likely involve neighbouring farms. In terms of FMD spread, if one
holding were to become infected, any neighbour would be at high
risk of infection, irrespective of whether an SOA or CTS Link
were present. One could question the need to link two holdings
that are very geographically dispersed, as it would be unlikely that
cattle movements between the two holdings would be frequent.
Therefore, distance limits on Additional Land links may well be
considered. We note that there was previously a 50 km distance
limit between holdings within an SOA, although this has now been
disbanded. Furthermore, a limit on the number of CTS Links that
an individual holding can be in may well reduce the observed CTS
Chains to smaller less risky units. The increase in the use of CTS
Links as well as SOAs could simply reflect changes within the
farming industry. If there are fewer farms, those that remain may
become bigger through expansion into old farm land, but distinct
CPHs must still remain due to distance rules on how far farm land
can be from the main steading.
Broadly speaking, our analyses suggest that while SOAs and
CTS Links are important, they are important because of the
number of holdings so registered, rather than because of the
activity associated with them. Under a worst case scenario of ‘‘one
infected – all infected’’ both SOAs and CTS Links pose a risk of
increasing epidemic sizes, but further investigations are needed
into whether CTS Chains are transmission chains, and also
investigations into intra-SOA movements and livestock distribu-
tions, in order to develop realistic alternative scenarios.
Methods
Data
Full details on the different data sets used in the data analysis
and model simulations can be found in the Text S1. For the
modelling, livestock movement data for England and Wales in
2008 from both CTS and AMLS was used. Movements to
slaughter were removed. CTS movements were batched, where
individual movements with the same dates, departure and
destination holdings were grouped together; AMLS data is already
in a batch format. Holding location data (such as CPH, holding
type and easting/northing co-ordinates) also came from AMLS
and CTS whilst holding population data came from the 2008
census.
Model
The model [3] was individual-based at the level of the holding,
and stochastic. Holdings were described by their dates of
becoming exposed, infectious via movements, infectious via local
spread, and removed, determined by the timings of movements
and local spread events. Based on these dates, the holdings could
be classed into one of the four states:
(i) S - These are holdings without exposed or infectious
animals.
(ii) H-These are farms containing animals exposed to
infection, but with all these animals subject to isolation
(triggered by the movement of animals onto the farm) until
the movement restriction period has elapsed. The
movement restriction period is 20 days for pigs, whereas
for sheep and cattle, it is 6 days for England and Wales,
and 13 days for Scotland [8]. These holdings do not
constitute a source of further infection by either movement
or local spread.
(iii) E-These holdings are similar to H, except with exposed
animals not under movement restriction (e.g. it was
infected by local spread), thus constituting a risk of further
infection through off movements. These holdings are not
yet infectious by local spread, but off-movements can carry
exposed animals. A latent period of 3 days was used, within
the range given by [6].
(iv) I-These are holdings containing infectious animals, after
the latent period, which are a source of infection by both
off-movement and local spread. FMD can spread rapidly
within a population, infecting whole herds of cattle or pigs
within one cycle of infection (ca 3 days). Therefore, we
consider the entire holding as potentially infectious within
this period after exposure [13].
Once infected, farms are assumed to remain infectious until the
end of the simulation. Markets, however, are assumed to be
disinfected and not continually occupied by livestock. Therefore in
the model, infected markets re-enter the S state at the end of the
following day, to allow for single overnight stays of livestock.
Epidemics were seeded by selecting a fixed small number of
holdings (5 seeds are selected) from those with off-movements on
the first day of the simulation. These are set to be infectious on this
day. Consistent with the 2001 epidemic (e.g. [6]), the simulations
were run for 28 days, beyond which it is assumed unlikely that an
epidemic could persist without being identified. For the Pan Asia
strain of FMD, clinical signs in cattle and pigs are typically
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these are also less susceptible [14].
If a holding is exposed or infected, there are three ways in which
the disease can spread to other holdings:
1. Movements: Only movements from exposed (E) or infected
(I) holdings or markets can cause infection, and the risk of
infection is assumed higher for movements of large numbers of
animals. Different probabilities of infection, which are then
weighted by the number of animals moved, are assumed for the
movements of sheep compared to movements of cattle or pigs;
movements of cattle or pigs from an infected holding are all
assumed to be potentially infectious, whilst movements of sheep
from an infected holding have a lower probability of infection.
Furthermore, different probabilities of infection are assumed
for movements from an infected market, as such movements
are less certain to be infectious than those from an infected
holding. Thus, for movements off a market (in the E or I state),
m was set at mm_sheep=0.004 for sheep and mm_other=0.02 for
cattle and pigs. For other movements, we assumed a value of
mother=1.0 for cattle and pigs (all movements are potentially
infectious) and msheep=0.02 for sheep. These movement
parameters were based on the 2001 FMD epidemic and
analysis of movements from infected holdings that resulted in
infection spread [3].
2. Local Spread: Local spread unrelated to known movements
from infected (I) holdings was modelled using a constant rate of
generation of new infected holdings per day per infected
holding b=0.065. Local spread is assumed to be a combina-
tion of factors, including human and vehicle movements,
possible airborne spread and nose-to-nose contact of livestock
across boundaries. On each simulation day, a number of
infectious contacts were selected for each infectious holding
from a Poisson distribution with mean b, without replacement,
considering only holdings reported as containing livestock in
the agricultural census (or redistributed SOA population).
Contacts were limited to a 10 km radius, and weighted
according to distance d by p,e
2ad, where a=0.5 km
21.
These local parameters were based on 2001 FMD epidemic
sizes [3,15]. Susceptible contacts become exposed on the
current day of simulation. Infection by local spread negated the
effect of any imposed standstill, and off movements from
infected holdings were considered to potentially contain
exposed animals.
3. Intra-SOA spread: Although movements within an SOA
now need to be reported, very few within-SOA movements are
recorded. This could be due to confusion on reporting
requirements. Therefore, if one member of an SOA becomes
infected, we assume that the rest may be infected too, due to
unrecorded movements of infectious animals within the SOA.
Upon infection of a holding on a given day, the model
(optionally) identifies any other holdings within the same SOA,
these then become infected and gain the same date of exposure
as the source holding, but only become a source of further
infection on the subsequent day (the day after the initial
holding in SOA became infected), to allow time for distribution
of animals within the SOA. In addition to the above, ‘‘one
infected – all infected’’ option for within SOA spread, two
other options for intra-SOA spread are available. In the model,
all SOAs that were active on 01/01/2008 were considered in
simulations throughout 2008. For CTS Links, all links that
were active on 01/01/2008 were considered. These were then
amalgamated into CTS Chains of linked holdings to form SOA
like groups to create a worse case scenario of one infected – all
infected in the CTS Chain. Three linked holding scenarios
were considered in the model: (1) SOAs only; (2) CTS Links
only, and (3) SOAs and CTS Links.
Epidemic simulations were run with starting times varied across
the 2008 at 14-day intervals and repeated simulation at each
starting point (simulations were repeated 400 times). The exact
start day used in each simulation was subject to up to 14 days of
jitter (i.e. a random value of up to 14 days is added to the defined
start day to examine that period of the year rather than that
specific day), in order to avoid unusual properties that might be
associated with a single day. The distribution and prevalence of
each 28-day simulated epidemic were recorded and divided by the
number of seeds used.
Network Analysis
For the network analysis, a directed network of 73,926 nodes
(premises) and 317,816 directed edges (movements) were created
from the GB cattle movements for 2008, excluding movements to
slaughter; markets were considered for this analysis and treated as
farms. The shortest path between all pairs of connected nodes was
then calculated, saving the source and destination nodes of the
path. CTS Links active on 01/01/2008 were then added to the
network as bi-directional edges, increasing the number of nodes
and edges in the network by 20% and 4% respectively. The
shortest path length between the saved pairs of source/destination
nodes was then re-calculated in this expanded network.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Model Data. Full details on the different data sets used
in the data analysis and model simulations.
(DOC)
Figure S1 Cumulating distribution of the mean inter-
farm distances of the component premises of SOAs. Over
90% of the farms that comprise each SOA are within 10 km of the
other units of that SOA, that figure is almost 100% when a
distance of 50 km is studied.
(TIFF)
Figure S2 Comparison of sheep movements TO SOAs
Vs NonSOAs. Monthly sheep movements to agricultural
holdings within SOAs are shown in blue bars, whilst monthly
sheep movements to agricultural holdings not in SOAs (Non-
SOAs) are shown in red bars. The total number of SOAs and
Non-SOAs contributing to the month’s sheep movements are
shown with the blue and red lines respectively. Movements to the
same holdings or the same SOA were removed along with
movements to slaughter. Only movements from ‘‘agricultural
holdings’’ or ‘‘store markets’’ to other ‘‘agricultural holdings’’ were
considered.
(TIFF)
Figure S3 Number of new SOAs by month (black lines)
and number leaving the scheme (red lines) by month.
After the initial peak in new SOAs at their inception, the number
of farms joining the scheme each month has been marginally
greater than the number leaving the scheme.
(TIFF)
Figure S4 The number of premises to which each main
holding is linked. The majority of main holdings only have one
linked premises. Links that expire and are subsequently renewed
are only counted once.
(TIFF)
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ical spread with SOAs and CTS Chains combined. SOAs
and CTS Chains were combined to form one large set of SOA/
Chain linked holdings. The model was run including the
combined SOAs/Chains, with the following distance limits on
intra-Chain spread: No Limit (red), 50 km (green), 16 km (purple),
and 8 km (black). Epidemic size (number of infected holdings per
seed) and geographical size (number of infected grid squares per
seed) were firstly transformed into percentages of the control
epidemic size from the same time of year. Secondly, averages were
then obtained for the four quarters of the year (Jan-Feb-Mar
[squares], Apr-May-Jun [circles], Jul-Aug-Sep [triangles], Oct-
Nov-Dec [diamonds]) giving four data points for each scenario.
Error bars are associated with each quarterly average value that
represent the 95% confidence intervals for that quarter, assuming
a normal distribution and a standard deviation calculated from
that quarter’s data.
(TIFF)
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